Ukraine's best-known strike ground-robot unit says what it has built so far is only a start. In an interview with Janes on 6 October 2026, published 9 October, Mykola Zinkevych, call sign "Makar", said his unit will grow far beyond its current size. Zinkevych commands NC13, the strike unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) unit inside Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps.
"What we have implemented now will be scaled up hundreds of times over the next six months," Zinkevych told Janes. He said the unit is developing new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and plans a substantial expansion over that period. "We are developing absolutely all possible directions where UGVs can be used for strike purposes," he said.
That is a big promise from a unit whose combat record comes almost entirely from its own reporting. Here is what NC13 and the 3rd Army Corps say they have done, how they say they do it, and which parts can be checked.
What NC13 says its robots are doing now
The clearest recent example comes from a 3rd Army Corps Telegram post reported by Ukrainska Pravda on 28 September. According to the corps, NC13 soldiers modernised ground "kamikaze" drones and used UGVs equipped with two Bullspike grenade launchers each. The UGVs attacked Russian positions, then detonated directly inside the shelters.
The corps says each vehicle does three jobs at once: strikes, psychological pressure and clearing positions, "without any risk to our infantry." According to the corps, operators controlled the robots from a shelter tens of kilometres from the line of contact. It also claimed that no one in military history had used this tactic before. That is the unit's own description and has not been independently checked.
Janes' lead image points the same way. It is taken from a video published on 3 October that purportedly shows one-way attack (OWA) UGVs before they detonated during the 3rd Army Corps' Operation Vivaldi. Janes notes that the equipment visible above the vehicles may be Starlink terminal panels or other communications gear.
The 'Gryphon' tactic: robots delivered by air
The second technique tied to the unit is more ambitious. An opinion piece in the Kyiv Independent by Kateryna Lisunova, published 2 October, calls it "Gryphon." Heavy drones fly 15 to 20 kilometres into the enemy's rear and drop UGVs, which then drive even deeper.
Lisunova writes that the first successful operation took place in January 2026 and that the unit now has "more than 100 successful operations." She calls NC13 "essentially the world's first strike UGV unit" and places it within the Third Army Corps; photo captions name the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade. Her article is an opinion piece and gives no independent evidence for the operation count.
Ukrainska Pravda's report adds some background. The 3rd Army Corps had earlier said it air-dropped UGVs behind Russian lines in northern Donetsk Oblast during Operation Vivaldi. According to the corps, this helped liberate two villages and clear a third. Like the other combat claims here, this comes from the corps itself.
Control links and the electronic warfare question
Electronic warfare (EW) is the obvious weak point for any remotely operated ground vehicle. Radio links that work over open ground can fail behind terrain, inside buildings, or under jamming. Zinkevych told Janes that NC13 uses several command-and-control (C2) communication methods that can be switched during operations. These include digital, analogue and encrypted radio links.
He said EW disruption "occurs infrequently" and is resolved quickly by the unit's communications personnel, programmers and IT specialists. He also made a broader claim: "we can control the UGVs from anywhere in the world." Janes does not say which link types carry that long-range control. However, the possible Starlink-style panels in the Vivaldi footage suggest satellite connectivity may be part of it. That is an inference from imagery, not a statement from the unit.
The "infrequently" claim needs care. It is a commander's assessment of his own unit's systems. It does not tell us how often links fail, how long recovery takes, or how many vehicles are lost when a link drops at the wrong moment.
Operation Vivaldi and the logistics burden
NC13's strike work has been described as part of Operation Vivaldi, a 3rd Army Corps offensive. The figures for that operation come from several official sources and should be read as such. According to the Kyiv Independent opinion piece:
- The operation restored Ukrainian control over 176 square kilometres.
- Zelensky's office said Russian forces lost more than 5,000 killed and wounded in the first three phases, and that Ukrainian forces captured another 250 Russian troops.
- The Third Army Corps separately reported 2,000 Russian losses in the most recent phase.
- Per Zinkevych and UNITED24 Media, ground robotic systems carried out 80% of logistics and 90% of casualty evacuations during stages of the operation. These are single-source claims and the piece offers no independent verification.
The logistics figures may matter more than the strike footage. If they are anywhere near accurate, UGVs are doing much of the dangerous, repetitive work near the front: moving supplies and evacuating wounded soldiers. Strike UGVs get the attention, but a fleet that handles most resupply and casualty evacuation would be the larger change in how a brigade fights.
Why It Matters
The basic idea is simple. Instead of sending infantry into a Russian dugout, NC13 says it sends an armed robot that attacks first and then detonates inside the shelter. In a war where small drones watch almost every approach, taking soldiers out of that last stretch of ground is the whole point.
Scale is what matters now. Zinkevych's "hundreds of times" may be rhetorical, and the portion of the Janes interview available without a subscription does not say what is being multiplied: vehicles, operators, missions or units. A large expansion still raises practical questions the public reporting does not answer. These include production capacity for vehicles that are destroyed on each mission, supply of Bullspike-type weapons, operator training, and whether multi-path C2 links will hold up against heavier jamming with many more robots on the network.
There is also a verification gap. The tactics are documented in video and corps statements. Their results are not. The Bullspike attacks, the Gryphon operation count, the villages taken and the logistics percentages all come from NC13, the 3rd Army Corps, the Ukrainian government or outlets citing them. Those claims may prove accurate, but for now they are claims. Armies watching Ukraine as a test case for ground robotics, as the Kyiv Independent piece urges Washington to do, should treat them that way until independent battlefield data is available.
Still, the direction is clear. NC13 now describes itself as a strike formation with its own tactics, airborne delivery and long-range control. Its commander says he intends to make it far larger within half a year.
