Germany's two new loitering munitions have cleared a live-fire test, but the government has said almost nothing about how they performed. The Bundeswehr procurement office, BAAINBw, announced that Stark's Virtus and Helsing's HX-2 both passed a "hot-strike" campaign in calendar week 46 of 2026, the week of Nov. 9. It gave no figures. The office did not say how many munitions were fired, how many hit their designated targets, or how many warheads worked on impact.
What it did say is that the result keeps a tight schedule on track. First deliveries are planned for this year, for training and exercises. The 45th Armored Brigade (Panzerbrigade 45), the German Army formation in Lithuania, is due to be equipped from 2027. Both milestones depend on test campaigns like this one, and on a contracting model Berlin built so that testing and procurement could run side by side.
What was actually tested?
According to the BAAINBw statement, as reproduced by Defence Network, the campaign focused on the effect chain, from the munition's approach to the target through the effect of its warhead. Defense News/C4ISRNET reported that the trials checked two things: whether the drones hit their designated targets, and whether the warheads worked on impact. That is a narrow and specific question. It is not the same as asking whether the systems are ready for service, and C4ISRNET said the campaign focused on that final part of the process rather than certifying the systems for service.
Much of the work took place at the Bundeswehr's weapons and ammunition test center in Meppen, Wehrtechnische Dienststelle 91 (WTD 91). Germany-based ESUT describes the range as covering about 200 square kilometers. Photos attached to the statement, according to C4ISRNET, showed both a Virtus and an HX-2 moments before impact into a tank. Neither the procurement office nor the outlets that reported its statement described the engagement ranges, the weather, or whether any electronic warfare was simulated.
ESUT, quoting the BAAINBw, reported that the live firings demonstrated the effectiveness of the "overall systems" and that the successful demonstration is an important part of the overall qualification process that is still running. Passing this campaign allows training and exercises to start this year. It does not finish qualification.
Two different airframes, one requirement
Germany chose two suppliers for the same broad mission, and their designs differ. ESUT describes Virtus, from Stark, as designed as a vertical-takeoff aircraft, while Helsing's HX-2 has an X-shaped wing arrangement. Both are electrically powered, and ESUT reports that both have been tried in Ukraine. The procurement office gave no performance numbers for either system, such as range, endurance or warhead size, and this article does not add any.
How big is the buy?
The reported money comes in several layers, and the sources describe them a little differently.
C4ISRNET reported that on Feb. 25, the Bundestag's budget committee approved contracts worth €268 million ($294.4 million) apiece for Stark and Helsing. Options could add €1 billion to each deal, but further purchases depend on the systems proving technologically mature and lawmakers approving the spending.
ESUT reported that the BAAINBw signed framework contracts on Feb. 26. The first call-off covers 2,200 Virtus munitions from Stark for about €270 million, and 4,300 HX-2 munitions from Helsing at a comparable value. ESUT puts the combined volume of the two seven-year framework agreements at about €4.3 billion.
Taken together, the reports describe a first call-off of a few hundred million euros per vendor, sitting inside much larger seven-year frameworks. By ESUT's figures, the first call-off implies roughly €123,000 per Virtus (€270 million divided by 2,200) and, if the HX-2 value is close to €270 million, roughly €63,000 per HX-2 (divided by 4,300). Those are rough averages only. Neither the government nor the companies have published per-unit prices, and the call-off totals alone do not show what each contract includes, such as launchers, ground control, training or support.
C4ISRNET said the procurement office expects initial deliveries this year so troops can begin training, but did not say how many weapons would arrive in that first batch.
Why build the contracts this way?
The procurement office's release explains the structure. Development, testing, qualification and preparation for use are designed to run partly in parallel rather than one after another. Future users were brought in early so their feedback could feed into development. The contracts include defined abort criteria and what the office calls innovation clauses.
C4ISRNET reported that lawmakers attached reporting requirements to the spending plan, and that cancellation clauses allow the government to walk away if a system fails qualification. In practice, the government has committed money before qualification is finished, and kept the right to stop if the systems fall short.
This is a deliberate break from the traditional sequence. ESUT contrasts it with the older practice in which a design freeze produced a finished product for procurement, and says today's fast development cycles no longer allow that. The trade-off is risk. If a fault turns up late in qualification, it may already be in hardware that has been delivered. The abort criteria and cancellation clauses are meant to manage that risk. They also mean that campaigns like the Meppen firings can work as decision points, not just engineering milestones.
What does a "pass" without numbers mean?
This is the obvious gap in the announcement. A statement that both systems "passed" tells readers they met whatever standard the BAAINBw set for this campaign. It does not say what that standard was. A threshold for passing might be a minimum hit rate, a requirement that every warhead functions, or a demonstration that the full sequence from launch to impact works at all. Without the criteria or the results, outsiders cannot tell whether the systems cleared the bar easily or barely made it.
There are ordinary reasons for a military to hold back these figures. Hit rates and failure modes of weapons that may be used against an adversary are sensitive. Public scorecards can also become weapons in a commercial contest between two competing suppliers. Even so, the lack of data matters, because the contracts tie further spending to technological maturity and to parliamentary approval, and the sources do not say what, if anything, lawmakers have been shown.
It is also worth being precise about what a hot-strike campaign at a domestic test range is designed to show. By the BAAINBw's description, it tests whether the systems reliably hit designated targets and whether the warhead functions properly at the target. The broader questions, such as reliability over many shots, performance against defended targets, and integration into Army command networks, are not addressed by the published results, and the BAAINBw says the overall qualification is still running.
Why It Matters
Germany is trying to field loitering munitions on a timeline more like a wartime procurement cycle than a peacetime one. Training deliveries are planned within the same calendar year as the live-fire tests, and the 45th Armored Brigade in Lithuania is to be equipped from 2027. According to Defence Network's account of the release, the systems are then to be integrated into the Army's reconnaissance-and-effects network.
The Meppen result is an early sign that this compressed approach is producing hardware that works as intended in a live-fire setting, though the lack of data limits how far that can be pushed. It is also an early test of whether the safeguards built into the contracts will be used openly. With roughly €4.3 billion in framework volume at stake across two vendors, the next decisions to watch are when the remaining qualification steps are reported, how many units arrive for training, and whether lawmakers approve the option money. For now, Berlin has said that its new strike drones passed. It has not yet shown how well.