Ryan Riccucci, a senior adviser at U.S. Customs and Border Protection, described one problem with counter-drone security at the World Cup. A command center had nine screens. On one of them, the same drone was detected three times. By his account, the problem was that the data from different vendors did not line up.

Riccucci told the story at the Red Hat Government Symposium in October. It now matters for the next event. Department of Homeland Security officials said Nov. 12 that security planning for the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics, including counter-drone work, began right after the World Cup ended. The 2028 Games will bring more than 15,000 athletes to Los Angeles, and the torch relay will pass through all 50 states. That gives planners a large and spread-out area to protect from small drones.

One Drone, Three Tracks

According to FedScoop, Riccucci said the cause was vocabulary, not detection. "We have two different words for the same thing," he said. Depending on the vendor or agency, one unmanned aircraft might be labeled a threat, a drone, a hostile, a credible threat or an item of interest.

When several sensor feeds send their output to one display, these different labels make it hard to merge reports into a single track. "One screen has the same drone detected three times, and another one only has the singular vendors who can see if it's three drones or one," Riccucci said.

The danger is clear. An operator watching a busy airspace has to decide whether three tracks are one intruder or a coordinated group. That decision affects how resources are assigned, what gets escalated and whether anyone moves to defeat the drone. Riccucci summed up the gap: "Google Translate for data, that's what really is missing."

This is a familiar problem for anyone who has worked on multi-sensor integration. Radar, RF detection, electro-optical and acoustic systems from different makers each produce their own data. Fusing them requires agreed definitions, not just shared network connections.

The $1.5 Billion Vehicle

DHS's main tool for this problem is a large multiple-award contract. FedScoop reported that the department started spending up to $1.5 billion on drone defense, with awards to companies including Anduril, Booz Allen and GDIT, and that 47 vendors competed. The contract has two indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) tracks:

  • Track one covers hardware, software, training and maintenance, with a ceiling of just over $1 billion.
  • Track two covers services: system integration, research and development, and counter-UAS delivered as a fully managed service. Its ceiling is under $500 million.

DroneXL reported that seven vendor slots are for services, including interoperability. That is the area where Riccucci's three-detection problem would be addressed.

The federal award records add detail. The USAspending.gov entry for PIID 70RDA226D00000002 describes a multiple-award IDIQ for counter-unmanned aircraft systems, Track 1 hardware, software and ancillary services. The recipient is D-Fend Solutions AD Inc. The record lists a signing date of July 31, 2026, a base-and-all-options value of $1.5 billion, and a period of performance from Aug. 1, 2026, to July 31, 2031. The initial obligation was $250.

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Two details in the record do not match the press accounts exactly. First, the D-Fend record shows a $1.5 billion value, while FedScoop gives the Track 1 ceiling as just over $1 billion and the whole program as up to $1.5 billion. Second, the record lists 57 offers received, compared with the 47 competing vendors in FedScoop's report. The record does not explain either difference.

DroneXL reported the contract's minimum performance requirements: systems must detect a drone at 2 kilometers (about 1.2 miles), track at least three at once, and stop one at 500 meters (about 1,640 feet). Those ranges point to venue-scale protection rather than wide-area defense.

The Cost Problem

The cost of defeating each drone came up at the top of DHS. On Nov. 9, DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin said one of the department's one-way attack drones costs $40,000 to produce and can be used only once. He said a single-use drone at that price is not economically feasible: "we're kidding ourselves to think it is going to work," according to FedScoop and DroneXL.

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His point is a common one in counter-UAS work. The arithmetic is simple: spending $40,000 on a single-use aircraft for every incursion would add up fast at a large event with many incursions. Mullin also told industry to make its systems affordable, DroneXL reported.

Grants, Seizures and Stretched Resources

Federal money is also going to state and local agencies. DroneXL reported that FEMA's second $250 million round of counter-UAS grants requires states to file by Monday, Nov. 16. FEMA wants 80% of the jammers and takeover systems bought with grant money to be used at events such as the Games. FedScoop reported that FEMA is also thinking about resource limits, because hurricanes and earthquakes can pull staff and equipment away from planned events.

The World Cup gives a sense of the workload. The Department of Transportation counted more than 700 drones seized across the 11 host cities, according to DroneXL.

The Secret Service is presenting LA28 as a joint effort from the start. "We're already all working together to make sure that LA '28 is secure," said Amy Szestak, special agent in charge of the Secret Service Office of Administration. She called UAS and counter-UAS "incredibly important missions."

Why It Matters

The World Cup showed that buying sensors and effectors is the easier part of counter-drone security. The harder part is getting systems from different vendors and agencies to agree on what they are seeing. A single drone shown as three tracks wastes operator attention during the minutes when it matters most. In a worse case, it hides a real multi-drone threat behind the noise.

DHS now has a five-year contract, running to 2031, with a services track built partly around interoperability. FEMA grant money is putting more counter-drone equipment in state and local hands. Unless that equipment uses a common data model, LA28 command centers could have more screens showing the same duplicate tracks. Riccucci's "Google Translate for data" is a fair test for the contract's early task orders. Watch whether integration and data-standard work gets funded before 2028, or whether it waits until after more hardware is bought.

Sources