A small Remote ID hardware company in Pendleton, Oregon, has started testing radio modules from a South Korean supplier. The deal itself is modest. The regulation around it is not. Since December, the Federal Communications Commission's Covered List has included unmanned aircraft systems and UAS critical components produced in any foreign country. The listing does not separate adversaries from allies, so a module built in Seoul is treated the same way as one built anywhere else outside the United States.

Zing Drone Solutions, which makes the Z-RID Lite Remote ID module and the Z-SCAN drone detection system, announced a memorandum of understanding with Seoul-based NUCODE on Oct. 5, DroneXL reported. The agreement covers an evaluation and nothing more. No hardware has been bought, and price, volume and delivery dates are left for a definitive agreement that does not yet exist.

What the two companies agreed to

According to DroneXL, the sequence was simple. Zing sent NUCODE a request for information, and NUCODE answered with samples of a Wi-Fi/BLE combination module. Zing is testing those samples against its size and power targets and for supply-chain hygiene features: secure boot, signed firmware and bill-of-materials transparency.

Both executives described the deal in terms of trust rather than performance. Zing founder Ian Annase said customers need "a clean path to Remote ID compliance." NUCODE CEO Bruce Lee said "customers need to trust the supply chain."

Zing is not new to compliance work. According to DroneXL, Zing says Z-RID Lite holds approvals in the United States, Europe and Singapore, and that Z-SCAN is deployed at Oregon Department of Corrections facilities and at Salinas Airport.

What the FCC actually listed

The governing document is FCC public notice DA 25-1086, which the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau released on Dec. 22, 2025, under WC Docket 18-89, ET Docket 21-232 and EA Docket 21-233. Based on a National Security Determination the bureau received on Dec. 21, the notice adds UAS and UAS critical components "produced in a foreign country" to the Covered List, along with equipment and services listed in Section 1709 of the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act.

The determination lists the components it means: data transmission devices, communications systems, flight controllers, ground control stations, controllers, navigation systems, batteries, smart batteries and motors. Its stated rationale is that such equipment, when produced in a foreign country, could enable persistent surveillance, data exfiltration and destructive operations over U.S. territory.

The listing applies to foreign production in general and, as DroneXL notes, contains no carve-out for allies. The one opening the notice itself describes is a specific determination from the Department of War or the Department of Homeland Security that a given UAS, class of UAS or critical component does not pose such risks. As DroneXL also notes, the notice never mentions Remote ID.

The exemptions that do exist

The FCC has carved out some room since December. DroneXL reports that the agency exempted Blue UAS components and U.S.-made products with at least 65% domestic content in January, and in July extended both exemptions through Jan. 1, 2028. DroneXL adds that the FCC also dropped the end date on Department of War Conditional Approvals, the case-by-case route a foreign part would most likely need. A Korean module would therefore have to arrive through a Blue UAS listing, a product that clears the domestic-content threshold, or a Conditional Approval.

The question nobody has answered

DroneXL identifies the open issue: does a general-purpose radio module count as a drone component? Data transmission devices and communications systems are on the list. A Wi-Fi/BLE combo module is a general-purpose part that can also go into products with nothing to do with drones. Remote ID broadcast modules are radios, and their job is to transmit aircraft identification and location data. Because the notice never mentions Remote ID, the text does not settle whether a general-purpose module is a drone component, or whether it becomes one once it sits inside a Remote ID broadcaster.

The supply chain adds another layer. According to DroneXL, NUCODE's published boards run on Nordic Semiconductor chips from Norway, and NUCODE says it is Nordic's only official third-party Bluetooth 6.0 module partner in Korea. A U.S. buyer that switches to a Korean supplier is therefore taking on a product that mixes a Korean-made module with Norwegian silicon. That mix could matter under a rule written around where components are "produced," though the sources do not say how the FCC would treat it.

Why Oregon, and why Korea

The deal fits into a broader Korean push into the Pacific Northwest drone ecosystem. On July 14, Korea Investment Accelerator, a subsidiary of Korea Financial Group, signed an MOU in Seoul with the Oregon UAS Accelerator, Asia Business Daily reported. The Oregon UAS Accelerator is based in Pendleton, Zing's home town, and its CEO is Joseph Waino. The agreement aims to bring Korean defense and drone startups to the U.S. market.

By late August, that agreement had turned into physical infrastructure. Korean outlet SmartToday reported that Korea Investment Accelerator built an "Oregon Defense Tech Basecamp" in the Portland area for Korean defense and drone startups. The basecamp provides housing, vehicles, communications, shared office space and an on-site manager. SmartToday named NUCODE and Datium among the portfolio companies taking part in the Oregon UAS Accelerator's demonstration programs and said a technology demonstration event is planned for the end of the year.

None of the reporting says the accelerator arranged the Zing-NUCODE MOU. DroneXL does note that the signing photo carried the Basecamp banner, and the SmartToday report shows that NUCODE was already part of the Oregon accelerator's demonstration programs before the deal was announced.

Why It Matters

A U.S. drone maker looking for radio suppliers outside China might assume an allied supplier is the safe choice. DA 25-1086 makes that assumption less reliable, because the text treats "foreign" as one category. An allied supplier gets no automatic benefit from being allied. According to DroneXL, the available routes run through Blue UAS status, domestic content or a Department of War Conditional Approval, and the Blue UAS and domestic-content exemptions are set to run only through Jan. 1, 2028.

For Remote ID in particular, the stakes are practical. The module that provides Remote ID broadcast is a radio. If regulators decide that a general-purpose Wi-Fi/BLE module is a covered "data transmission device" when it is used for drone broadcast, then the part that carries a drone's identification could itself become a regulatory problem. If they decide it is not, allied radio suppliers have a clear way into the market.

Zing's evaluation does not resolve that question. Its test criteria (secure boot, signed firmware, bill-of-materials transparency) are the kind of evidence that could support a case for approval, though neither company's announcement mentions the Covered List. For now the MOU is an evaluation with no money attached. DroneXL's own advice is to watch whether a definitive agreement names an approval path. The more consequential decision on how the rule applies to radios like these will come from the FCC and the Departments of War and Homeland Security.

Sources