Russian forces released footage on Sept. 29 of a strike on the Inkom business center in Kyiv. According to Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, an adviser to Ukraine's president on defense technology development, a Geran-5 jet-powered drone carried out the strike. A second jet-powered drone circled above the site at nearly 3 kilometers altitude. Beskrestnov says that second aircraft was equipped with a mesh radio. It acted as a signal relay for the Geran-5 while filming the attack and sending the video back immediately.

That detail comes from a Kyiv Independent investigation published Oct. 21. It shows how Russia keeps an operator in control of long-range strikes deep inside Ukraine without the Starlink link it used before. This piece looks at that link: how commands reach a jet drone far beyond the range of a direct radio connection, and why Ukraine finds the link hard to break.

Losing Starlink

The Kyiv Independent reports that Russia has had to find other ways to keep remote control of its drones after SpaceX blocked unauthorized Starlink terminals used by Russian forces in early February. Russian fixed-wing drones are now being fitted with mesh radios, which the outlet describes as an effective alternative to Starlink, though with limitations of their own.

Russia's own satellite option is still developing. The Kyiv Independent notes that Russia began deploying its Rassvet low-Earth-orbit constellation in 2026, and that the program has suffered early setbacks, including the loss of one satellite and failures that left others outside their intended orbits. On Oct. 16, Defense Express reported that flat panels bearing a symbol similar to the logo of Bureau 1440 (the company building Rassvet) had been found on Molnia-2 drones. Beskrestnov denied that they were Rassvet terminals. He noted that some of the panels had been bent by zip ties, and that these Molnias appear to be fully autonomous and AI-controlled, with no other communications equipment on board. Defense Express also reported that, because too few satellites are in orbit, the Rassvet communication window is very short, measured in tens of minutes.

How the mesh link works

A mesh network is a decentralized system in which nodes can connect to several other nodes and route data dynamically, rather than relying on one fixed path. Each transfer of a signal from one radio to the next is called a "hop." Range is no longer set by a single line of sight between the operator and the drone. It depends on how many relays can be chained together.

The Kyiv Independent says Russian drones have been documented carrying the Chinese-made XK-F358 mesh radio. Mark Hay, CEO of defense company Melrose Networks, told the outlet the radio can support networks of up to 63 hops. In practice, the outlet notes, the number of hops depends on how much data must be sent, because each added relay introduces delay and cuts the available data rate. RAND researcher Michael Bohnert said mesh can let Russian forces operate drones "two, three, maybe even four times further" than a direct radio link would allow.

Analysis published by Calibre Defence, cited in the same report, says a chain of mesh-controlled Gerans or other UAVs could maintain connectivity and live operator control up to 150 to 175 kilometers from the furthest ground control station. That is roughly twice the range Beskrestnov reported in 2025. The hardware is not cheap. According to the Kyiv Independent, some Chinese-made mesh radios used on Russian drones cost more than $8,000 apiece.

Based on the reporting, the relay chain has three layers:

  • Ground relay stations near the front line or along the borders with Russia and Belarus, where the chains begin. Calibre Defence measures range from the furthest of these.
  • Airborne relays, such as the second jet drone at nearly 3 km over the Inkom strike. The Kyiv Independent notes that airborne relays work best at altitude, where drones keep a clear line of sight to each other.
  • Possible ground relays inside Kyiv. Beskrestnov believes enemy mesh radio relays are being activated in Kyiv to give Shaheds temporary, short-term control channels, "perhaps one to three," and says no other Shaheds were in the air to act as airborne relays during the strike on the headquarters of Ukraine's Security Service (SBU). The Kyiv Independent presents this as his belief, not a confirmed finding. Hay agreed such a setup is technically possible: a mesh radio on a rooftop or in an apartment could reach the internet through fixed broadband, Wi-Fi or a cellular network.

If in-city relays exist, they would matter most at the end of the flight. The Kyiv Independent notes that as a drone descends, buildings, terrain and the curvature of the Earth obstruct the radio signal, and a relay inside Kyiv could carry the connection through that final stretch.

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Range versus jam resistance

The design involves a trade-off. Bohnert told the Kyiv Independent that networks built for greater distances can become easier to jam, while more resilient networks need their nodes closer together. Even so, Hay said mesh is "a very difficult thing to defeat because it can work around your attempts to defeat it." Because traffic can travel through multiple paths, losing one relay does not necessarily break the connection, and relay drones can be pushed forward or replaced as they are destroyed.

The reporting names one unit in particular. The Kyiv Independent identifies Russia's 50th Separate Unmanned Systems Brigade "Varyag" as a pioneer in the use of mesh-equipped Geran and Gerbera drones for reconnaissance and long-range strikes.

The same brigade's AI claims

The Varyag brigade is also making claims about autonomy. Janes reported on Oct. 20 that the 50th Varyag Separate Brigade of Unmanned Systems Forces said in a social media post on Oct. 13 that a new AI-based variant of the Molniya, the Molniya PVO SPP, had entered service. The brigade claimed the drone had struck down at least five Ukrainian Maya UAVs and two Fire Point FP-1 one-way attack drones. It gave no further details, and the claim has not been independently verified.

Janes noted that the Maya drones may be decoy platforms. The Bulgarian Defence Ministry said Maya decoys are widely used by Ukraine's armed forces after one crashed near the Romanian border on the morning of Aug. 8. Janes also pointed out that Beskrestnov referred on July 3 to an autonomous, AI-enabled Molniya, writing that "UAV detectors no longer offer protection."

Taken together, the reporting suggests two approaches to the same problem. Long-range mesh networks keep an operator connected over long distances. Onboard autonomy, of the kind Beskrestnov describes on the Molnia-2 drones that carried no other communications gear, would avoid depending on a link at all. That is an inference from the reporting, not something either source states.

Ukraine has its own link problem

Ukraine is also dealing with the limits of satellite links. The War Zone reported on Oct. 20 complaints from Ukrainian officials that "in various sectors of the front, the equipment ceases to function at speeds of 130-161 kilometers per hour" under Starlink/Starshield speed limits. The outlet says this affects strikes on Russian logistics behind enemy lines and the control of interceptor drones used against Russian long-range one-way attack drones such as the Shahed-136. The War Zone cited Reuters reporting that the order to limit the satellite system used by Ukraine came from inside the White House. A representative of Ukrainian interceptor maker Wild Hornets told the outlet the issue is not affecting its current operations but that it makes the company rethink some projects, such as launching interceptors from aerial platforms.

The contrast is plain: Russia lost access to Starlink and built its own mesh links, while Ukraine's use of the same commercial network is limited by decisions made elsewhere.

Why It Matters

Cutting off unauthorized Starlink terminals did not end Russia's ability to control drones beyond the range of a direct radio link. Russia adapted with Chinese-made mesh radios and drones acting as relays. If Calibre Defence's 150 to 175 km estimate is right, the reach is roughly double what Beskrestnov reported in 2025.

For Ukrainian air defense, this changes what counts as a target. A jet drone circling at nearly 3 km over a strike may be an essential part of the attack, since by Beskrestnov's account it relayed the control link and returned video. Taking out a relay could disrupt the operators, though Hay notes a mesh network can route around a lost node. Any ground relays placed inside a city would be a problem for security services as much as for electronic warfare units.

Mesh is also unlikely to be the end state. Hay expects Russia to use mesh, cellular and eventually satellite links together, "possibly whichever one works at a given point in time during a flight." The reported AI-based Molniya variants point to autonomy as another path. The Varyag brigade's claim about its AI-based Molniya remains unverified. Still, the brigade appears in the reporting on both approaches, and Ukrainian defenders will need countermeasures for each.

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